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IMPROVING THE SUPPLY OF AFFORDABLE




The low-income housing tax credit ("LIHTC"), which was
created as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986' and made perma-
nent by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993,2 utilizes
the Internal Revenue Code to provide an incentive for the construc-
tion and rehabilitation of low-income rental housing. By lowering
the overall cost of producing housing units through the provision
of tax credits to developers and owners of qualified rental projects,
the intent of the LIHTC is to stimulate investment in low-income
housing development. Accordingly, the purpose behind the LIHTC
is to increase the supply of decent and affordable housing in the
United States.
The LIHTC represents another step in Congress' increasing
reliance on the private sector to supply low-income housing. The
federal government first attempted to provide affordable housing to
poor Americans primarily in the form of public housing, whose
construction was subsidized by public funds and whose operations
* J.D., University of California at Berkeley (Boalt Hall) School of Law;
A.B., University of Illinois, Urbana. The author is grateful to Professor Alan
Auerbach, Jim Grow, Robin Linn and Lara Muldoon for their insightful
contributions, and to my parents for their support.
' Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986).
2 Omnibus Budget ReconciliationAct of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat.
312 (1993).
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were managed by local public housing authorities.3 During the
1960s and 1970s, Congress began placing more reliance on the
private market to supply low-income housing. Congress created
several housing programs, including programs to assist low-income
home buying,4 as well as rent subsidy programs, such as Section
8,5 in order to provide incentives to private developers to create
and maintain affordable rental housing units.' An even greater
emphasis was placed on the private market during the 1980s, as the
federal government reduced direct federal housing spending while
manifesting a view that the private sector, rather than the public
sector, was better able to provide low-income housing.7
With the continual decline in direct federal funding for low-
income housing, the LIHTC has become a substantial housing
program. In 1991, the itax expenditure for the low-income housing
credit was $.6 billion, compared to the $1 billion that was spent on
housing vouchers.8 The Congressional Budget Office estimates that
the low-income housing tax credit has the potential to become an
even larger program, costing as much as $3 billion per year.9
The LIHTC replaced several tax incentives for rental housing
development that existed under prior laws.10 In an effort to curb
real estate tax shelters, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 eliminated
' See Tracy A. Kaye, Sheltering Social Policy in the Tax Code: The Low-
Income Housing Credit, 38 VILL. L. REv. 871, 877 (1993).
4 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-1 (West 1996); 12 U.S.C. §17151(d)(3) (1998).
' 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o) (1996); 24 C.F.R. § 982 (1996). Section 8 refers to
Section 8 of the revised United States Housing Act of 1937.
6 For a discussion of federal housing programs in the United States see
NATIONAL HOUSING LAW PROJECT, HUD HOUSING LAW PROJECT, TENANTS'
RIGHTS (2d ed.) (1994).
7 See Janet Steams, The Low-Income Housing Tax Credit: A Poor Solution
to the Housing Crisis, 6 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 203, 205-06 (1988).
8 Congressional Budget Office, The Cost Effectiveness of the Low-Income
Housing Tax Credit Compared with Housing Vouchers: A CBO Staff Memo-
randum (1992), reprinted in 56 TAX NOTES 493, 494 (1992) [hereinafter CBO].
9 Id.
0 Although the LIHTC is a tax incentive that does not involve the direct
appropriation of federal funds, it is considered a tax expenditure since it results
in a revenue loss to the federal government just like a direct appropriation. See
2 U.S.C. § 622(3) (1996); Steams, supra note 7, at 206 n.27.
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favorable tax treatment for expenses incurred in the development
of rental housing, including special accelerated depreciation and full
expensing of construction period interest and taxes.' While the
LIHTC replaced these prior incentives for investment in low-
income housing, the objective of the tax credit program was to
target more assistance to low-income families than did the tax
incentives available under prior law. 2
Thus far, the low-income housing tax credit has aided the effort
to provide affordable, quality housing, with many low-income
rental units being constructed or rehabilitated through use of tax
credits. However, the LIHTC has not and will not, as it is currently
drafted, meet the goal of providing "a decent home and suitable
living environment for every American family," a goal articulated
nearly fifty years ago by the United States Housing Act of 1949."3
I. THE NATION'S HOUSING CRISIS
There is a critical need for affordable housing in the United
States. Almost 8.4 million families, or 12.3 percent of all American
" The Internal Revenue Code formerly permitted special accelerated
depreciation pursuant to I.R.C. § 168(b)(4) (CCH 1985) (amended 1986). The
Internal Revenue Code now requires all residential rental property to be
depreciatedover 27.5 years. I.R.C. § 168(c)(1) (CCH 1996). The full expensing
of construction period interest and taxes was formerly allowed pursuant to I.R.C.
§ 189(d)(1) (CCH 1985) (repealed 1986).
12 CBO, supra note 8, at 493. The term "low-income families" is defined as
those families with incomes that do not exceed 80 percent of area median
income, with adjustments for family size. The term "very low-income families"
means families whose income does not exceed 50 percent of area median income,
with adjustments for family size. 42 U.S.C. §1437a(b)(2) (1996). "Extremely
low-income families" refers to families with less than 25 percent of area median
income, with adjustments for family size.
13 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1996). The United States Housing Act of 1937
similarly states, in pertinent part, "[i]t is the policy of the United States ... to
remedy the unsafe and unsanitary housing conditions and the acute shortage of
decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings for families of lower income." United States
Housing Act of 1937, ch. 896, 50 Stat. 888 (1937) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 1437 (1996)).
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families, live below the poverty line.' 4 Furthermore, over 11.5
million families, or 16.8 percent of all families, have an annual
income of less than $15,000.'5 Moreover, over 15 million Ameri-
can households are considered low-income, with approximately 9
million living at very low- or extremely low-income levels.
16
To compound the difficulties that the poor experience, the
supply of affordable housing has not kept pace with the demand.
Nationwide, rents have increased at faster rates than has the median
renter income, and average rents continue to remain near their 25-
year peak (1987) levels.17 Meanwhile, from 1980 to 1992, the
supply of public housing grew only slightly, with an increase of
only 2,200 units during that period.' 8 Moreover, the number of
public housing units under construction annually has declined from
20,900 units in 1980 to only 7,200 units in 1992.'9
Due to the persistent shortage of affordable housing, rent
burdens have been most severe on low-income tenants.2 ° Federal
subsidies have not done enough to alleviate this burden since the
vast majority of low-income families do not receive Department of
Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") funded rental assis-
tance." As a result, low-income renters are forced to search for
housing in the unsubsidized market, where they face severe rent
burdens and often live in structurally inadequate housing.
22
Nationwide, approximately 44 percent of all renters spend 30
14 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES: 1995 at 474 tbl. 752 (1995).15 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 14, at 474 tbl. 731. Figures are
based on constant 1980 dollars.
16 See JOINT CENTER FOR HOUSING STUDIES, THE STATE OF THE NATION'S
HOUSING 31 (1994). For a definition of low-income, very low-income, and
extremely low-income see supra note 12.
17 JOINT CENTER FOR HOUSING STUDIES, supra note 16, at 3.
"S See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 14, at 741 tbl. 1238.
'9 See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 14, at 741 tbl. 1238.
20 JOINT CENTER FOR HOUSING STUDIES, supra note 16, at 15.
21 JOINT CENTER FOR HOUSING STUDIES, supra note 16, at 16-17.
22 JOINT CENTER FOR HOUSING STUDIES, supra note 16, at 17. See also THE
REPORT OF THE MITCHELIJDANFORTH TASK FORCE ON THE LOW-INCOME
HOUSING TAX CREDIT (1989) [hereinafter THE MITCHELLIDANFORTH REPORT].
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percent or more of their income on housing costs. 23 A recent
study found the rent burden to be most severe among poor renters,
with 75 percent of low-income households spending 30 percent or
more of their income on housing.24
Moreover, 71 percent of extremely low-income renters who do
not receive housing subsidies, or a total of 2.7 million renters, paid
more than half of their income in rent. 25 An additional 844,000
renters lived in housing that was structurally inadequate. 26 The
LIHTC provides some relief for these renters by creating a tax
incentive that makes it more attractive financially for developers to
construct or substantially rehabilitate low-income rental housing.
II. EXPLANATION OF THE Low-INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDIT
The low-income housing tax credit, codified in section 42 of the
Internal Revenue Code, allows owners of qualified low-income
rental housing to claim a tax credit annually over a ten year period.
The LIHTC contains several complicated rules and requirements.
The provisions with the most relevance to the analysis of this paper
are explained in this section.
A. Qualified Buildings
Only "qualified low-income project[s]" are eligible to receive
a low-income housing tax credit.27 Both the new construction and
the substantial rehabilitation of eligible residential rental properties
may qualify for the tax credit program.28 In addition, a taxpayer
who places an existing building in service as a low-income project
23 See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS AND DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND
URBAN DEVELOPMENT, SUPPLEMENT TO THE AMERICAN HOUSING SURVEY FOR
THE UNITED STATES 1993 tbl. 3-2 (1993).
24 Timothy S. Grail, Households at Risk: Their Housing Situation, in U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT CURRENT HOUSING
REPORTS (H121/94-2) (1994).
25 JOINT CENTER FOR HOUSING STUDIES, supra note 16, at 17, 31.
26 JOINT CENTER FOR HOUSING STUDIES, supra note 16, at 31.
27 I.R.C. § 42(c)(2), (g) (West 1996).
28 I.R.C. § 42(d), (e).
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may qualify for the tax credit as long as the building was acquired
by purchase, was not previously placed in service by the taxpayer
or related party and has not changed ownership or undergone major
improvements for the past ten years.29
To qualify for the credit, the building must be a residential
rental property and must set aside a minimum number of rent-
restricted residential units.3" Accordingly, the owner of a LIHTC
rental project must elect to have either 20 percent or more of the
building's residential units rent-restricted and occupied by renters
whose income is 50 percent or less of area median gross income,
or have at least 40 percent or more of its residential units rent-
restricted and rented to tenants whose income is no greater than 60
percent of area median gross income. 3' These two elections are
commonly referred to as the "20-50 test" and the "40-60 test."
Once the election is made, it is irrevocable.32 Furthermore, tax
credits are available only for the number of units in the rental
project that are rent-restricted and occupied by qualifying low-
income tenants.33
The LIHTC places restrictions on the amount of rent that may
be charged for the low-income units. For these units, the gross rent,
including utilities but excluding any payment made under the
Section 8 program, may not exceed 30 percent of qualifying
income, using a family size equal to 1.5 times the number of
bedrooms in the unit.34 This provision limiting the maximum rent
29 I.R.C. § 42(d)(2). Certain federally assisted buildings acquired during the
ten year period that receive a waiver from the Secretary of the United States
Department of Housing and Urban Development may qualify as low-income
housing for purposes of the LIHTC. I.R.C. § 42(d)(6). The requirements
concerning existing buildings are intended to prevent both the original and
subsequent owners of a qualified housing project to claim the tax credit.
30 I.R.C. § 42(g).
"' I.R.C. § 42(g)(1).
32 I.R.C. § 42(g).
13 I.R.C. § 42(c), (g).
34 I.R.C. § 42(g)(2). An efficiency unit is treated as if it is occupied by one
person while all other units are treated as occupied by 1.5 persons for each
separate bedroom. I.R.C. § 42(g)(2)(C). Therefore, a two-bedroom unit is
considered to be occupied by a three-person family.
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that may be charged is designed to ensure that the rent-restricted
units are affordable for low-income tenants.
B. Credit Amount
The dollar amount of the tax credit that is awarded to an owner
of a qualified building is calculated as a percentage of the owner's
basis in the rental units that are set aside for low-income tenants.35
1. Qualified Basis
Qualified basis is determined by multiplying a building's
eligible basis by the "applicable fraction. ' '36 The applicable
fraction is the lesser of the unit fraction, which is the ratio of low-
income units to total units in the building, or the floor space
fraction, which is the ratio of total floor space of the low-income
units to the total floor space of all residential rental units, whether
occupied or not.37
For purposes of the credit, the eligible basis is the building's
adjusted basis at the end of the first taxable year of the credit
period.38 Common areas may be included in the calculation of
qualified basis.39 However, a building's eligible basis must be
reduced by the amount of certain federal housing grants provided
to the building.4° For buildings used, at least in part, to provide
supportive services designed to assist homeless tenants in finding
and retaining permanent housing, the qualified basis is increased by
the lesser of 20 percent of the building's qualified basis before
adjustment or the basis attributable to the portion of the building
used throughout the tax year to provide the services.41
" I.R.C. § 42(a), (c).
36 I.R.C. § 42(c).
31 I.R.C. § 42(c)(1).
3" I.R.C. § 42(d).
39 I.R.C. § 42(d)(4)(B).
40 I.R.C. § 42(d)(5)(A).
41 I.R.C. § 42(c)(1)(E).
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2. Applicable Percentage
The "applicable percentage" for LIHTC purposes depends on
the characteristics of the building being placed in service. The
applicable percentage is determined monthly by the Treasury
Department, and it is set so as to yield, over the ten year period in
which the credit may be claimed, a credit with a present value
equal to 70 percent or 30 percent of the building's qualified basis,
depending on the building's characteristics. 42 For new and sub-
stantially rehabilitated buildings that do not receive additional
federal subsidies, the present value of the credit is equal to 70
percent of qualified basis. 43 Therefore, due to the time value of
money, the annual credit that a taxpayer may take is approximately
9 percent of qualified basis.' Existing buildings and federally-
subsidized buildings are eligible for a tax credit with a present
value equal to 30 percent of qualified basis, or approximately 4
percent annually for the ten year period.45 For existing buildings
that undergo substantial rehabilitation, the eligible acquisition costs
qualify for the 30 percent credit, but the rehabilitation expenditures
may receive the 70 percent present value credit.46
3. Special Rules for Projects in High Cost Areas
A higher credit is awarded to buildings located in an area
specifically designated by the Secretary of Housing and Urban
Development as a "qualified census tract" or "difficult development
area." '47 A qualified census tract is an area in which 50 percent or
more of the households have an income which is less than 60
percent of area median gross income. 48 A difficult development
42 I.R.C. § 42(b). See Jeanne L. Peterson, The Low-Income Housing Tax
Credit, 73 MICH. BAR J. 1154, 1155 (1994).
41 I.R.C. § 42(b)(2).
- I.R.C. § 42(b)(1)(A).
41 I.R.C. § 42(b)(1)(B).
46 I.R.C. § 42(e). See Rev. Rul. 91-38, 1991-26 I.R.B. 5.
41 I.R.C. § 42(d)(5)(C).
48 I.R.C. § 42(d)(5)(C)(ii).
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area is an area in which there are high construction, land and utility
costs relative to area median gross income. 49 For new buildings
constructed in a qualified census tract or difficult development area,
the higher credit amount is achieved by increasing the property's
eligible basis to 130 percent of the otherwise eligible basis. 0 For
existing buildings, the rehabilitation expenditures included in the
eligible basis are increased to 130 percent of total rehabilitation
expenditures."
C. Credit Period
A qualifying taxpayer may take the tax credit annually for ten
taxable years, beginning the year in which the project is placed in
service.52 If certain requirements are met, the taxpayer may elect
to have the credit period begin in the taxable year succeeding the
year that the building is placed in service. 3 A credit recipient also
must agree to maintain the building's qualifying low-income status
for at least fifteen years.5
4
The LIHTC requires that eligible projects maintain an extended
commitment to low-income housing. Accordingly, a qualified
project must remain a rental property and continue to meet the
income and rent requirements for a minimum fifteen-year per-
iod.55 Owners must continually monitor and recertify tenant
incomes in order to ensure compliance since an increase in a
tenant's income may disqualify the tenant. 6
49 I.R.C. § 42(d)(5)(C)(iii).
50 I.R.C. § 42(d)(5)(C)(i)(I).
5' I.R.C. § 42(d)(5)(C)(i)(II).
52 I.R.C. § 42(0(1).
53 I.R.C. § 42(f)(1)(B).
14 I.R.C. § 42(h)(6).
" I.R.C. § 42(g)(2), (h)(6), (i)(1).
56 See Andrew Z. Blatter & Elena Marty-Nelson, An Overview of The Low
Income Housing Tax Credit, 17 U. BALT. L. REv. 253, 260 (1988); Peterson,
supra note 42, at 1156.
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D. Credit Recapture
The Internal Revenue Code provides for the recapture of the
low-income housing credit where, with limited exceptions, the
LIHTC property fails to meet the income and rent limitation
requirements.57 However, a rental unit may continue to be treated
as a low-income unit even if the occupant's income rises above the
income limitation, as long as the occupant's income originally met
the applicable income limitation, the unit continues to be rent-
restricted and the occupant's current income does not exceed 140
percent of the income limitation.58 Credit recapture may also
occur when a project owner sells an interest in the property.5 9
E. Application of Passive Activity Rules
LIHTC properties receive favorable tax treatment under the
Internal Revenue Code's passive activity rules. The Internal
Revenue Code allows a taxpayer who "actively" participates in a
rental real estate activity to deduct up to $25,000 of annual losses
attributable to the rental real estate. 60 This allowance is subject to
a phase-out reduction for taxpayers whose adjusted gross income
exceeds $100,000.61 However, the phase-out provision does not
apply to investments in low-income housing funded by the
credits.62 Moreover, investors in LIHTC properties are not subject
to the active participation requirement.63 Therefore, an investor in
a LIHTC project may take advantage of the $25,000 offset
regardless of the investor's level of participation. This favorable tax
treatment under the passive activity rules may further encourage
investment in low-income housing.
I.R.C. § 42(j). However, the credit recapture amount phases out in the
11 th through 15th years. CBO, supra note 8, at 494.
" I.R.C. § 42(g)(2)(D).
59 I.R.C. § 42(j).
60 I.R.C. § 469(i).
61 I.R.C. § 469(i)(3)(A).
62 I.R.C. § 469(i)(3)(C).
63 I.R.C. § 469(i)(6)(B).
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F State Housing Agencies
State housing agencies play an essential role in the LIHTC
program. Credit authority is given to each state's designated
housing agency, which is responsible for allocating the credits to
qualified developers.' 4 The LIHTC sets an annual credit ceiling on
the aggregate amount of credits that each state's housing credit
agency may allocate.6 5 A state's annual credit ceiling is deter-
mined by multiplying $1.25 by the state population." Each state's
ceiling also includes the unused credit ceiling from the previous
year and any unused credits returned during the calendar year. 7
Each state's housing agency must establish a qualified alloca-
tion plan for the distribution of the credits.68 The plan must set
forth selection criteria, establish procedures to monitor noncompli-
ance, and give preference in credit allocation to projects serving the
lowest income tenants and projects obligated to rent to qualified
tenants for the longest periods.69 Moreover, the LIHTC mandates
that the dollar amount allocated to a project may not exceed the
amount that the state housing agency determines is necessary to
ensure the project's viability and earn investors a fair rate of
return.7°
Accordingly, before issuing the credits, the state agency must
consider the sources and uses of project funds, the proceeds
expected to be generated by reason of the tax benefits, the
percentage of the credit used for project costs other than intermedi-
ary costs, and the reasonableness of the proposed developmental
and operational costs of the project.71 Finally, the LIHTC requires
that at least ten percent of a state's housing credit ceiling be
allocated to qualified low-income housing projects in which a
64 I.R.C. § 42(h).
61 I.R.C. § 42(h)(3)(B).
66 I.R.C. § 42(h)(3)(C)(i).
67 I.R.C. § 42(h)(3)(C)(ii).
61 I.R.C. § 42(m).
69 I.R.C. § 42(m)(1).
70 I.R.C. § 42(m)(2)(A).
7' I.R.C. § 42(m)(2)(B).
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qualified nonprofit organization owns an interest in the property,
either directly or through a partnership, and materially participates
in the development and operation of the project.72
III. HAS THE LIHTC MET THE Low-INCOME HOUSING NEED?
By awarding a tax credit for new construction and substantial
rehabilitation, the LIHTC is designed to help solve a prevalent
problem among low-income individuals: the lack of affordable
housing. Therefore, it is important to consider the effectiveness of
the tax credit in stimulating the construction and renovation of low-
income housing. The relevant measure in making this determination
is the net additions to the housing stock of rental units developed
through use of low-income housing tax credits that would not
otherwise be provided by the unsubsidized market. It is also
appropriate to consider the cost-effectiveness of the credit program.
To best measure the costs and benefits of the LIHTC, one needs
to know not simply the number of units constructed or substantially
rehabilitated with tax credits, but the number of units developed
with the credits that would not have been constructed or rehabili-
tated without use of the credits. The benefit of these additional
units would be determined based on the present value of the market
rents that could be charged for the units and the decline in market
rents resulting from the increase in the supply of rental housing.73
However, this is difficult to measure since there is a general lack
of data concerning the LIHTC and tax credit information from
individual tax returns is not readily available. A 1983 study
concerning the effectiveness of supply-side housing subsidies
suggested that subsidized construction largely displaces unsub-
sidized units.74 Still, there are no studies that specifically focus on
the effect of the low-income housing tax credit on unsubsidized
construction. Nevertheless, it appears from the available data that
72 I.R.C. § 42(h)(5).
71 JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS OF TAX
PROVISIONS EXPIRING IN 1992, at 78 (1992).
74 See infra notes 125-128.
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the LIHTC has not stimulated a sufficient production of low-
income housing nor has it been cost-effective.
An article by Frank Racaniello, analyzing data contained in a
report by the National Council of State Housing Agencies, provides
some insight into the quantity and cost of units produced through
use of the tax credits, at least during the initial years of the credit
program.75 Racaniello reported that in 1987, low-income housing
tax credits assisted in the production of 33,575 low-income rental
units.76 In 1988, the number of units produced with credits rose
to 77,825. 77 This amounts to an increased production of slightly
more than 230 percent.78 However, from 1987 to 1988, the
utilization of the credit grew from 18 percent to 66 percent of the
total credit dollars available, an increase of almost 370 percent.79
Thus, in 1988, significantly less housing was produced per credit
dollar expended than in 1987. Furthermore, in 1987, the credit cost
per unit was $1,646.80 In 1988, the credit cost per unit increased
to $2,598.8" In 1989, the credit cost per unit decreased slightly to
$2,434, but again increased in 1990 to $2,855.82
In California, for example, from 1987 to 1996, the California
Tax Credit Allocation Committee allocated $362.4 million in
federal low-income housing tax credits to 54,862 units.83
75 Frank A. Racaniello, Extending the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit: An
Empirical Analysis, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 753, 761 (1991) (citing NATIONAL
COUNCIL OF STATE HOUSING AGENCIES, STATE INITIATIVES TO INCREASE
LOWER INCOME HOUSING DEVELOPMENT USING THE LOW-INCOME TAX CREDIT
(1989)). Another primary source of statistical data that Mr. Racaniello used was
THE MITCHELLJDANFORTH REPORT, supra note 22.
76 Racaniello, supra note 75, at 761.
77 Racaniello, supra note 75, at 761.
78 Racaniello, supra note 75, at 761.
79 Racaniello, supra note 75, at 761.
'o Racaniello, supra note 75, at 761. The average credit cost per unit of
$1,646 was derived by dividing the 1987 actual allocations ($55,285,954) by the
total number of low-income units produced by the credit ($33,574).
" Racaniello, supra note 75, at 761.
82 Racaniello, supra note 75, at 761-62.
83 Letter from Mary Low, Program Analyst, California Tax Credit Allocation
Committee, Sacramento, CA to David Cohen (Nov. 22, 1996) (on file with
author).
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Moreover, $45.4 million in federal tax credits were allocated to
6,184 units during 1996. 4 Nationwide, the LIHTC has provided
over $2.9 billion in tax credit allocations over the ten year period
from 1987 to 1996.5 To date, 842,438 units have been con-
structed or rehabilitated using low-income housing tax credits
nationwide.86
The above data calls into question the cost-effectiveness of the
LIHTC, especially due to the high cost per unit. Furthermore, given
the relatively low production effect, the number of units developed
through the LIHTC still does not satisfy the overall need for low-
income housing in the United States. In fact, the amount is
insufficient to house just the low-income renters paying more than
50 percent of their income in rent.87 Furthermore, because there
is no source of information that reveals the number of low-income
units that would have been constructed if the credit program did
not exist, because of the data limitations noted above, it is difficult
to determine whether the credit program has resulted in any net
additions to the low-income housing stock. Given the assumption
that tax credit units have displaced at least some unsubsidized low-
income units, especially those unsubsidized units that would have
been built or maintained without the tax credits but now receive
credit subsidies, the net addition of rental units to the affordable
housing stock is less than the estimated number of total units
produced with the tax credits.
Moreover, the type of units that have been produced with the
housing tax credits do not necessarily meet the needs of many low-
income families. For example, the LIHTC does not place any
restrictions on the number of bedrooms that the subsidized rental
units must contain. As is similar with many other project-based
housing subsidies, the LIHTC does not guarantee that the housing
produced will be of appropriate quality, location and size for low-
income families. 88 Accordingly, although low-income families can
84 Id.
'5 Telephone interview with Jim Tassos, National Council of State Housing
Agencies, Washington, D.C. (Dec. 4, 1996).
86 Id.
8 See JOINT CENTER FOR HOUSING STuDIEs, supra note 16, at 17, 31.
88 CBO, supra note 8, at 496.
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often be quite large, less than 14 percent of the total units subsi-
dized by tax credits issued in 1987 and 1988 contained three or
more bedrooms.89 Consequently, the rental units that are produced
may not be of sufficient size for families that are most in need
because many units are too small to house large low-income
families and there are simply not enough multi-bedroom units being
developed.
Before next considering why the low-income housing tax credit
has not been able to produce housing that is sufficient to meet the
needs of poor families, it is useful to first consider the rationales
that support the government-funded provision of housing. In other
words, why should we be concerned about the supply of affordable
housing, and more importantly, why is it the government's
responsibility to ensure that these low-income rental units are
provided?
One rationale is paternalism. Paternalism not only applies to
government-sponsored housing programs but also runs across other
social welfare programs, such as food stamps and AFDC.90 With
respect to these programs, the government assumes a key role in
providing the necessities of life for those who, for any number of
reasons, are unable to provide for themselves. If the government
did not assume this role, the beneficiaries of the programs would
have great difficulty providing food and housing for their families.
Accordingly, the government takes on a paternal role in order to
prevent low-income heads of households from failing to provide for
their families, and thereby the government assistance prevents the
families from falling deeper and deeper into poverty, a likely result
for many poor families without the assistance of the government
programs.
A second rationale is that current expenditures on housing will
have a future benefit by lowering future cash outlays for welfare
programs. The provision of affordable housing will not only allow
low-income renters to acquire decent shelter, but it will also enable
them to become more self-sufficient and less in need of government
assistance in the future. Providing low-income families with decent
'9 CBO, supra note 8, at 496.
90 See Food Stamp Act of 1977, 7 U.S.C. § 2011 (1998); 42 U.S.C. § 601.
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and affordable housing will produce a positive externality in that
it will give the heads of households an added opportunity of
finding work. In turn, the addition of these individuals to the
workforce will not only bolster the economy but it will also enable
more family heads to become self-sufficient and provide a better
future for their children.
This second rationale assumes, in part, that the housing
produced through the low-income housing tax credit program will
be located near job centers. The assumption will likely hold true
with respect to housing funded by tax credits since the majority of
tax credit developments will not consist of only low-income units,
but rather, will contain a combination of low-income and market-
rate units, with the majority of units typically being rented at
market-rate rent levels.91 In order to attract renters who are paying
full market-rate rents for their units, the housing will need to be
developed in areas that appeal to these renters. Therefore, it is
likely that the majority of the LIHTC developments will be built
outside of the inner city, with many projects appearing in areas of
new development and job growth.
IV WHY THE LIHTC DOES NOT MEET THE HOUSING NEED
A. There Is Not Enough Incentive to Rent to the Poorest
Families
Without the low-income housing tax credit or other federal
housing subsidies, there would be little incentive for developers to
provide low-income housing. Developments with low-rent units
typically do not experience adequate appreciation in value that
keeps pace with other fair market investments and do not generate
sufficient cash flow from rents to be attractive to investors.92 By
providing developers and investors of qualified projects with
9' See supra notes 30-33.
92 See, e.g., 132 CONG. REC. S8152 (daily ed. June 23, 1986) (statement of
Senator Cohen illustrating the lack of incentives for investments in low-income
housing); JOINT CENTER FOR HOUSING STUDIES, supra note 16, at 15; JOSEPH
GUGGENHEIM, TAX CREDITS FOR LOW-INCOME HOUSING 104, 131 (1992).
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additional cash flow in the form of tax savings through tax credits,
the low-income housing tax credit was designed to provide an
incentive for the development of the greatest number of affordable
housing units for low-income families.93
The enactment of the LIHTC reflected a Congressional concern
that the federal tax preferences for low-income housing existing
prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986 did not effectively meet the
housing needs of low-income tenants, including the "most needy
low-income individuals., 94 Additionally, the express provisions of
the LIHTC require that state housing agencies give preference to
projects serving the lowest-income families.95 However, there are
no requirements within the LIHTC mandating that the rents charged
in qualified projects be restricted to levels that are affordable to
families with income below 50 percent of area median income.
Instead, a housing development can qualify for favorable tax
treatment under the LIHTC by renting just 20 percent of its
residential units to families with income equal to 50 percent of the
area median income, or alternatively, by renting 40 percent of its
residential units to families whose income is 60 percent of the area
median income. Since owners of qualified projects can generate
larger cash flows by renting to tenants with the highest income
levels within the LIHTC guidelines, there is no incentive for these
owners to restrict rents to levels that are affordable for families
with very low- or extremely low-income. Furthermore, the LIHTC
may add to the difficulty that the poorest families face in finding
affordable housing. Federal guidelines define "affordable rent" as
rent that is no greater than 30 percent of a family's monthly
income.96 Thus, tenants, especially those with low incomes, are
advised to spend no more than 30 percent of their income on
housing so that they have funds available for other important needs,
9' See THE MITCHELIJDANFORTH REPORT, supra note 22.
94 S. REP. No. 99-313, at 758 (1986) (stating that the prior tax preferences
"operate in an uncoordinated manner, result in subsidies unrelated to the number
of low-income individuals served, and fail to guarantee that affordable housing
will be provided to the most needy low-income individuals"). See also Blatter &
Marty-Nelson, supra note 56, at 253.
9' I.R.C. § 42(m)(1)(B)(ii)(I) (West 1996).
96 42 U.S.C. § 1437a(a)(1) (1996); I.R.C. § 42(g)(2).
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such as food and clothing. In fact, tenants residing in most
federally subsidized housing pay only 30 percent of their monthly
income as rent. However, since the supply of federally subsidized
housing is inadequate, and therefore, many poor families must turn
to the private market for housing, these families are often forced to
spend more than 30 percent of their income on housing.9 7
The difficulties that poor families experience in finding
affordable housing can be illustrated by the following example.
Given the national median income for a family of four ($36,959),
an extremely low-income family of four may have income of only
$9,240.98 Therefore, using the 30 percent-of-income affordability
standard, this family should spend no more than $231 per month in
rent.99 It is highly unlikely that the family will be able to find a
two-bedroom apartment, or even a one-bedroom unit, on the private
market that charges a monthly rent of $230. In Los Angeles, for
example, the fair market rent ("FMR") for a two-bedroom
apartment is over $800 per month. 100 In Las Vegas and Phoenix,
where average property values are typically lower than in Southern
California, the FMR for a two-bedroom unit is roughly $600, which
is still unaffordable for the majority of poor families.''
Using the same example, a very low-income family of four will
have an annual gross income of approximately $18,500, or $1,540
per month.'0 2 Again, given the 30 percent-of-income affordability
" See Steams, supra note 7, at 204.
98 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENsus, supra note 14, at tbls. 732, 738. The
income of the extremely low-income family was derived by taking 25% of the
national median income ($36,959).
" This amount was derived by taking 30% of the family's monthly income
of $770.
'oo Fair Market Rents for the Section 8 Housing Assistance Payments
Program: Fiscal Year 1997, 61 Fed. Reg. 49,576 (1996). The actual fair market
rent (FMR) for Los Angeles is $854. Fair market rents are estimates of gross rent
published by the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development. 61 Fed. Reg. 49,576. HUD sets the FMRs primarily to assure that
a sufficient supply of rental units are available to participants in certain HUD
programs, mainly the Section 8 Rental Certificate Program. Id. The FMRs
include rent and utility costs, except telephone. Id.
10l Id. The actual FMR is $630 for Las Vegas and $574 for Phoenix.
102 These figures were derived by taking 50% of the national median income
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standard, the family should spend only $462 for rent. Rent in most
major metropolitan areas will be unaffordable for this family as
well, forcing the very low-income family to pay more than 30
percent of its gross income for rent.
Since projects receiving low-income housing tax credits must
set their rents for the low-income units based on the income
limitations of either 50 percent or 60 percent of area median
income, even the low-income rental units in these developments
will typically be unaffordable for most poor people. For example,
again consider a low-income family living in Los Angeles. In 1994,
the area median income in Los Angeles was $39,035.103 For the
purposes of this example, consider a family with an annual income
of $15,000, or almost 40 percent of the area median income. Using
the 30 percent-of-income affordability standard, this family should
pay monthly rent of no greater than $375. Further, consider a
project financed with low-income housing tax credits that sets its
rent levels for the low-income units based on 60 percent of the area
median income. The maximum rent that this project can charge for
a rent-restricted unit and still be in compliance with the LIHTC
would be $585 per month."° This is nearly half of the monthly
income of the family in our example. Moreover, it is roughly 20
percent higher than the national median rent in 1993.05 Even if
the rents for the project's low-income units were based on a
qualifying income level of 50 percent of area median income, the
rent charged would be $488, which is still well above the afford-
able rent level for the family in the example.0 6
Since the LIHTC does not require that qualified projects rent
their low-income units to families with income below 50 percent
or 60 percent of area median income, as long as there is a ready
($36,959).
103 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, COUNTRY AND CITY DATA BOOK: 1994
tbl. B (1994).
104 This figure was derived based on 30% of the monthly income of a family
with income equal to 60% of the area median income for Los Angeles ($39,035).
'05 In 1993, median rent was $487. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS AND
DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, SUPPLEMENT TO THE
AMERICAN HOUSING SURVEY FOR THE UNITED STATES 1993 tbl. 3-2 (1993).
106 For further examples see CBO, supra note 8.
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pool of renters, an owner of a tax credit project has no incentive to
charge rents below minimum levels. In an attempt to maximize
cash flow, an owner will likely elect to rent to families with the
highest qualifying incomes. Support for this position can be drawn
from the 1987 and 1988 tax years, during which 90 percent of
projects receiving a tax credit elected to satisfy the 60 percent of
area median income test.0 7 As a result, if a project owner elects
to meet the 40-60 test, the rent-restricted units will be unaffordable
for many low-income families.
B. Use of Area Median Income Is Flawed
An inherent flaw in the LIHTC is its use of area median
incomes, rather than the national median income, in the determina-
tion of qualifying income limitations. By using area median income
levels as guidelines, owners of rental properties in affluent areas
may be permitted to take advantage of the LIHTC by receiving a
tax credit while renting to families whose incomes are near the
national median. For example, although the national median income
is roughly $37,000, the median income for a family living in Main
County, California is over $59,000.1o8 Therefore, a LIHTC
project in Main may receive a tax credit if it rents 40 percent of
its units to families with incomes of 60 percent of the area median
income, or $35,494.
Similarly, in DuPage County, Illinois, where the median family
income is $54,920, or Douglas County, Colorado, where the
median family income is $54,244, a project may qualify for a low
income housing credit even though it rents to families with incomes
of $32,500.'09 Even in Los Angeles, a project may qualify for a
tax credit as long as 40 percent of the units are occupied by
107 JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, supra note 73, at 75 (citing U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, EVALUATION OF THE
LOW-INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDIT: FINAL REPORT, (1991)).
"o The area median income for Marin is $59,157. U.S. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, supra note 103, at tbl. B.
'09 See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 103, at tbl. B.
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families with incomes of $23,000.I1° Therefore, projects in
several areas of the country may qualify for housing tax credits
even though they are not serving families who are of truly low
income.
C. Inefficiency of the Credit
Although the LIHTC encourages investment in low-income
housing, there are several inefficiencies associated with it. Private,
for-profit developers, as well as public housing authorities and
nonprofit organizations with no tax liability to offset the tax credit,
use their tax credit allocations to attract funds."' In order to raise
capital for project development, developers often seek investors
who are willing to make equity contributions in exchange for tax
credits. However, in a tax credit transaction, the developer typically
receives less than the full value of the credit in equity since a
portion of the credit dollars covers the costs of the transaction and
is profit to the investors."2
The overhead and administrative costs associated with the
LIHTC are a primary source of its inefficiency." 3 The increased
bureaucracy resulting from the requirement that state housing
agencies allocate the credits leads to high administrative costs at
both the state and federal level. In general, the administrative and
overhead costs associated with a low-income housing program
appear to be much higher if a low-income housing unit is subsi-
dized with tax credits rather than with housing vouchers."'
The use of housing tax credits in the development of low-
income housing results in other transaction costs, particularly those
costs associated with the involvement of various parties in the
development process. For example, developers may hire lawyers,
consultants and accountants to assist in acquiring additional
financing, create limited partnerships, structure other syndication
"°See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 103, at tbl. B. This amount
was derived by multiplying 60% the median income for Los Angeles ($39,035).
.' See Peterson, supra note 42, at 1155.
..2 Steams, supra note 7, at 218.
1"3 CBO, supra note 8, at 493.
"" CBO, supra note 8, at 493.
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arrangements and ensure that the project meets all of the require-
ments necessary to qualify for the LIHTC. One HUD study found
the syndication costs in LIHTC transactions to be substantial,
averaging approximately 20 percent of the total cost of the
transaction. 1" 5 These transaction costs add significantly to the
total development costs, although they do not directly result in the
production of housing units. Furthermore, these costs can often
have high price tags, which tends to reduce the amount of tax
credit dollars available to bring rents to truly affordable levels." 6
The Congressional Budget Office ("CBO") has suggested that
some of the inefficiency associated with the LIHTC results from
the surplus benefits of the credits accruing to builders rather than
to renters. The supply-side subsidization of housing through tax
credits, as opposed to demand-side housing subsidies which are
given directly to tenants and can be used like cash in making rent
payments, may enable developers and their investors, rather than
tenants, to capture the majority of the benefits."7 Since the
credits are provided directly to developers rather than to tenants,
the developer can keep any excess benefit and has no incentive to
pass them along to the tenants. Although the provisions within the
LIHTC requiring rent restrictions and oversight by state housing
agencies are in place to protect tenants' interests, available evidence
suggests that these measures are relatively ineffective at ensuring
that excess benefits accrue to the tenants. 1 8
Efforts to target the credit in order to ensure that the subsidy
reaches the tenants have also significantly increased the adminis-
trative costs of state housing agencies, HUD and the IRS. For
example, Internal Revenue Code section 42(m) mandates that each
state housing agency make a determination of the minimum amount
of credit dollars necessary to maintain the financial viability of a
"' CBO, supra note 8, at 497 (citing U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING
DEVELOPMENT, EVALUATION OF THE LOW-INCOME HOUSING TAx CREDIT:
FINAL REPORT (1991)). The HUD study noted that the statistics may be biased
because of lack of response. CBO, supra note 8, at 499 n.6.
",6 See GUGGENHEIM, supra note 92, at 132.
... CBO, supra note 8, at 493.
"' See CBO, supra note 8, at 493.
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qualified project for the entire credit period."9 However, attempts
by state housing agencies to minimize the excess profits earned on
individual projects places a substantial administrative burden on the
government agencies as well as on the developers who are required
to submit this information. As a result, any excess profits recovered
are typically used to pay for the additional administrative costs
instead of assisting low-income individuals, with little or no
increase in the overall efficiency of the tax credit program. 20
Another source of the inefficiency arises from the displacement
of unsubsidized low-income units. Developers who would have
planned to build a low-income project or would have substantially
rehabilitated an existing structure even without the availability of
a tax credit, will now likely try to gain tax credit support for their
projects.121 As a result, this now subsidized project replaces an
otherwise unsubsidized building, with no net gain in the number of
low-rent units.' Moreover, a tax subsidy for low-income hous-
ing construction may induce resources that without the tax credit
would have been used for other housing to instead be devoted to
low-income housing.'23
In examining the cost-effectiveness and budgetary impact of the
tax credits, the CBO has pointed out that the low-income housing
tax credit, like other supply-side mechanisms, is unlikely to cause
a substantial increase in the supply of affordable housing.'24
Drawing support from a 1983 study concerning the effect of
supply-side subsidies administered by HUD in the 1960s and 1970s,
the CBO suggested that subsidized housing units may largely
displace unsubsidized units. 25 The study estimated that for every
three units of subsidized construction, unsubsidized housing
119 I.R.C. § 42(m)(2) (West 1996).
120 CBO, supra note 8, at 493, 495-97.
121 JOINT COMMITrEE ON TAXATION, supra note 73, at 71.
122 JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, supra note 73, at 71-72.
123 JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, supra note 73, at 71.
124 CBO, supra note 8, at 493.
125 CBO, supra note 8, at 496 (citing Michael P. Murray, Subsidized and
Unsubsidized Housing Starts: 1961-1977, in 65 REV. OF ECON. & STAT. 590,
590-97 (1983)).
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construction declined by at least two units.'26 In fact, as many as
85 percent of government-subsidized housing starts may displace
unsubsidized starts.'27 While the CBO noted that the study could
not examine the effect of subsidized new construction on the
quantity of existing housing available to the poor, it reasoned that
to the extent that subsidized housing removes some low-income
renters from the unsubsidized market, the demand for unsubsidized
units would be lowered and would therefore be expected to cause
some of the unsubsidized units to leave the affordable housing
stock. 121
Finally, the costs associated with the low-income housing tax
credit program can be substantial. Although housing subsidized by
tax credits is typically of better quality than the housing it replaces,
the benefit provided to the tenant is only a fraction of the cost of
the credits, with the improvement in quality often being worth less
to the tenant than its cost to the government. 29 In addition, the
provision of subsidies for new construction may produce an
inefficiently large quantity of housing services by creating units
with greater amenities or of a higher quality than that which low-
income individuals would have been willing to pay for given an
equivalent amount of money. 130
However, the tax credit may produce a positive externality by
increasing new construction starts in areas near job centers or by
stimulating new construction and promoting the rehabilitation of
dilapidated structures in run-down neighborhoods. Still, one HUD
study estimated that for units not receiving other subsidies, the cost
of the low-income housing tax credit was almost two times the cost
126 CBO, supra note 8, at 494 (citing Michael P. Murray, Subsidized and
Unsubsidized Housing Starts: 1961-1977, in 65 REv. OF ECON. & STAT. 590,
590-97 (1983)).
127 JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, supra note 73, at 71. However, since
this figure is based on both moderate and low-income housing starts, it may
overstate the inefficiency of tax incentives solely for low-income rentals. JOINT
COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, supra note 73, at 71.
28 CBO, supra note 8, at 496.
29 CBO, supra note 8, at 494.
130 CBO, supra note 8, at 494.
560
LOW-INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDIT
of vouchers to produce a similar unit of housing. 3' Even when
units subsidized by tax credits result in net additions to the housing
supply, the cost of providing the units can be quite high and
typically exceeds the cost of providing affordable housing through
vouchers.'32
V RECOMMENDATIONS
The low-income housing tax credit has flaws which must be
addressed. Therefore, Congress should consider making changes to
the LIHTC that will better enable the tax credit to meet the housing
needs of low-income families. This section suggests three alterna-
tives.
A. Determination of Qualifying Income Levels
As noted above, the use of area median income levels as
income guidelines may permit owners of qualified projects to claim
a tax credit even though their low-income units are not being
rented to truly low-income families. Therefore, to avoid this result,
a provision must be included in the LIHTC that requires the use of
the national median income, instead of area median income, in the
determination of qualifying income levels for tenants where the
area median income is higher than the national level. However,
since use of the national median income level may exacerbate the
housing shortage in presently low-rent areas as well as in moder-
ately-priced housing markets and rural markets, where area median
incomes are below the national average, it would not be beneficial
to determine qualifying income levels based on the national median
income. Therefore, the LIHTC must adopt a two-tiered approach.
In affluent areas, where the area median income is above the
31 CBO, supra note 8 at 494 (citing U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND
URBAN DEVELOPMENT, EVALUATION OF THE LOW-INCOME HOUSING TAX
CREDIT: FINAL REPORT (1991)). The study noted that the statistics may be biased
because of lack of response and that inferences about characteristics of new
projects eligible for the credit may not be valid since the applicable law has been
modified since 1988. CBO, supra note 8, at 499 n.6.
132 CBO, supra note 8, at 496.
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national median, the LIHTC program should use the national level
to determine income limitations for qualified projects. However,
where the area median income is less than the national median
level, or where the local costs of living are below national
averages, the area median income should continue to be used. This
provision would accordingly provide better assurance that low-
income housing tax credits are targeted to projects renting to
families who are of truly low-income. While use of the national
median income for markets where area median incomes are
substantially below the national median may create a subsidy
greater than Congress anticipated, this subsidy is necessary to
support the development of housing that is decent and affordable
to truly low-income families.
A potential result of the suggested two-tiered income approach
would be for owners and investors of buildings in high-income
areas to expect a lower return on their investment. In order to
maintain eligibility for the low-income housing tax credits, owners
of LIHTC projects in high median income areas will presumably
be forced to adjust the rents that they charge based on a lower
median income standard, the national median income. As a result,
the rents charged on the low-income units will be less than present
rental rates. Accordingly, the owners and investors of the buildings
affected by this change in the tax credit program would experience
a lower return on investment. This result may not be equitable
since developers of low-income projects in high-income areas may
face higher land and construction costs than are experienced in
areas where the area median income is below the national level. If
the return on investment is lowered due to a change in the
LIHTC's income guidelines, such a reduction in the rate of return
may create a disincentive for the development of low-income
housing in certain areas. Therefore, at the same time that Congress
considers the recommended change in the determination of median
income levels used in the LIHTC program, there must be a
recognition that the costs of development may be substantially
higher in areas where the area median income exceeds the national
median level due to higher land and construction costs. Accord-
ingly, the LIHTC must provide for additional subsidies to develop-
ers of projects in these areas in order to place such developers on
equal footing with other developers, and thereby provide the
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necessary incentive to stimulate development while enabling the
housing units to be rented at rates that are affordable to truly low-
income families.
B. Greater Assistance to Projects Serving Lowest-Income
Tenants
The LIHTC does not provide enough incentive for developers
and owners to provide housing that is affordable for our nation's
poorest families. Although the situation faced by low-income
renters is improved through the development of affordable housing
under the LIHTC program, very low and extremely low-income
renters may not realize any benefit under the present system since
many units funded by low-income housing tax credits charge rents
that are still unaffordable for these families. Without compromising
the amount of disposable income a family has available for needs
other than housing, many families with incomes below 50 percent
of median will not be able to afford rents charged by most LIHTC
projects. However, without additional subsidies, buildings with
units that are affordable to the lowest income families will likely
not be able to generate sufficient cash flow from rents or expe-
rience adequate appreciation in value to make them attractive to
investors. 3 Thus, most projects with rents that are affordable to
very low-income families will not be financially feasible for
developers without additional financial assistance.134 Furthermore,
since the LIHTC does not require that the low-income units be
rented to the lowest-income tenants, owners of LIHTC projects
have little incentive to charge rents lower than the 50 percent or 60
percent of area median income level dictated by the LIHTC.
Therefore, the LIHTC must establish better incentives for develop-
ers to maintain more than the minimum number of rent-restricted
units for low-income tenants and to provide units that are afford-
able to very low- and extremely-low income families.
This outcome could be achieved by increasing the credit amount
awarded to developments that rent to families with incomes of less
... See supra notes 92-93.
'3" GUGGENHEIM, supra note 92, at 87-104, 131.
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than 50 percent of median income. One way for this result to be
accomplished would be for the LIHTC to include a provision that
allows such developments to increase eligible basis by a specified
percentage, similar to the provisions concerning qualified census
tracts and difficult development areas.' An alternative method
would be to apply an increased credit percentage to buildings that
serve very low-income families. For example, the LIHTC could
permit projects that rent to very low- and extremely low-income
tenants to qualify for a credit greater than the current 70 percent of
present value credit. A higher credit percentage should lead to
increased investment and development of housing that is affordable
to the most needy families. Although such a provision would result
in a reduction of tax revenue to the federal government, since
higher credit amounts would be awarded to taxpayers, this is the
price that must be paid if Congress continues to reduce direct
federal housing spending while, at the same time, the affordable
housing shortage continues to plague the nation's poor.
C. Refundable Tax Credit
The previous recommendations concerned suggestions to correct
flaws in the LIHTC. The recommendations could be adopted
separately or in conjunction in order to effect the necessary
improvements. This final recommendation, however, advocates a
complete change to the low-income housing tax credit program.
Rather than providing low-income housing tax credits to
developers and owners of rental properties, as is done under the
current system, Congress should instead consider providing the tax
credits directly to low-income renters in the form of refundable tax
credits. The tax credits would be renter-based rather than project-
based, and they would be available for renters with income below
a specified amount. This change in the LIHTC would provide low-
income renters with an increased amount of disposable income to
spend on housing, thereby allowing them to afford better housing
and higher rents.
133 See supra notes 47-5 1.
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The effect of issuing a tax credit to renters with qualifying
income would be similar to that of a direct subsidy, such as a
housing voucher. A housing voucher is a demand-side subsidy that
provides low-income tenants with more money to spend on better
quality housing than they would otherwise be able to afford.'
36
An example of a demand-side housing subsidy program is the
federal Section 8 rental voucher program.1 37 Under the Section 8
rental voucher program, the federal government provides a subsidy
to low-income households in an amount equal to the difference
between the rental unit's fair market rent and 30 percent of the
renter's income.13 1 In its present form, the LIHTC subsidizes the
construction, acquisition and rehabilitation of units that are set aside
at below-market rents; it funds development costs instead of
subsidizing rents. 39 Both the voucher program and the housing
tax credit program result in expenditures for housing, with the tax
credit expenditure being in the form of a loss of tax revenue to the
government.
On efficiency grounds, a refundable tax credit issued directly to
renters would be superior to the current LIHTC. 40 First, a
demand-side subsidy would improve housing opportunities for low-
income families by increasing the families' ability to pay for
housing.' 4' Furthermore, a housing tax credit in the form of a
refundable tax credit issued directly to renters should reduce the
displacement of unsubsidized affordable housing units that occurs
under the present system. Since the credits will be provided to
tenants rather than to developers, developers will no longer have
the incentive to remove unsubsidized affordable housing units from
136 JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, supra note 73, at 70.
137 42 U.S.C. § 14371(o) (1996); 24 C.F.R. § 982 (1996).
42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o)(2).
'3 See JOINT COMMITrEE ON TAXATION, supra note 73, at 70.
14o See, e.g., Rachel Bratt, Public Housing: the Controversy and Contri-
bution, in RACHEL BRATr, CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON HOUSING 351 (Chester
Hartman & Anne Myerson eds. 1986)("Economic considerations alone suggest
that the most efficient scheme is to give those families now eligible for public
housing a cash subsidy, which the recipient can spend as he wishes so long as
he lives in standard housing." (quoting Eugene Smolensky (1968))).
'41 JOINT COMMITrEE ON TAXATION, supra note 73, at 70.
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the affordable housing supply.142 Rather, developers will have the
incentive to produce more rental units to meet the demands of these
new renters with greater abilities to pay for rent.
A refundable tax credit would also be more cost effective than
the present LIHTC, and it would certainly reduce the overall
administrative costs incurred under the current low-income housing
tax credit system. 43 Targeting the credit directly to renters, rather
than to developers and investors, would involve less administrative
obstacles, thereby reducing overhead and administrative costs. 44
It would also lower the administrative expenses at both the state
and federal level associated with the allocation of the credits and
the monitoring of projects receiving the credits. Furthermore, a
refundable tax credit would eliminate not only the transaction costs
associated with developers hiring attorneys and consultants but also
the syndication costs incurred in current tax credit transactions.
Moreover, since the proposed tax credit would be awarded directly
to renters rather than to developers, this new system would reduce
the potential for developers to reap a windfall of profits from the
credits.
There is, however, a potential problem with this proposed
refundable tax credit system. A rent subsidy may not increase a
family's expenditure on housing by the full amount of the subsidy
since there is no guarantee that the family receiving the subsidy
will use the total amount of the credit for housing. For example, a
study of the Section 8 Existing Housing Program found that a
typical family receiving a rent subsidy increased its expenditure on
housing by only $22 for every $100 subsidy, spending the other
$78 on other goods. 45 In other words, a family may rather spend
142 See supra notes 122-129.
143 See, e.g., Anne L. Alstott, The Earned Income Tax Credit and Some
Fundamental Institutional Dilemmas of Tax-Transfer Integration, NAT'L TAX J.,
Sept. 1, 1994, available in 1994 Westlaw 13462265 (discussing generally the
position of advocates in favor of administering income transfers through the
federal tax system).
'4 See CBO, supra note 8, at 493.
145 JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, supra note 73, at 71 (citing W. Reeder,
The Benefits and Costs of the Section 8 Existing Housing Program, J. PUB.
ECON. (1985)).
566
LOW-INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDIT
at least part of a $100 subsidy on food and clothing rather than on
housing. 1
46
Some economists may argue that the above result is favorable
since it allows parties to make their own utility maximizing
decisions. However, this reasoning suffers several criticisms,
particularly in the low-income housing context. It cannot be
assumed that the parties receiving the subsidy will act in a way that
maximizes their own utility or their family's utility. Moreover, the
utility maximizing decisions of some heads of households may not
be in the best interest of the entire family unit. If spending
decisions are left to the discretion of the tax credit recipients, it
may be that many of the recipients will not act in a manner that
provides the most benefit for the family. For example, some family
heads may receive the greatest enjoyment by using the $100 for
entertainment, whereas the family would be made much better off
by spending the money on housing. Although some families may
be made better off by spending the amount of the credit on food or
clothing rather than on housing, there is no guarantee that the
government subsidies, without restrictions on their use, will be used
in such a way. Therefore, the spending choices made available to
the recipients of the refundable housing tax credits must be
restricted to housing uses.
It is important that low-income families use the tax credit
dollars for housing since the acquisition of decent quality housing
may have several benefits beyond providing the family with shelter.
First, decent quarters provide a better quality of living, which
should improve the family's overall quality of. life. In turn, this
may provide family members with improved self-esteem and
attitudes, empowering them to work toward self-sufficiency.
Moreover, families receiving the tax credits will be able to afford
housing in locations that are closer to areas of new job growth,
thereby enabling heads of households to acquire jobs and get
started in the right direction on the road to self-sufficiency.
146 JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, supra note 73, at 71 (citing W. Reeder,
The Benefits and Costs of the Section 8 Existing Housing Program, J. PUB.
ECON. (1985)).
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There will be both winners and losers if a refundable tax credit
system is adopted. Low-income renters who qualify for the
refundable tax credits would certainly benefit. In general, the
situation faced by low-income renters is improved through the
development of affordable housing under the present LIHTC
program, although very low and extremely low-income renters may
not realize any benefit under the present system since many units
funded by low-income housing tax credits charge rents that are still
unaffordable for these families. The current credit system may also
cause owners of unsubsidized, low-rent buildings to remove their
units from the market, rehabilitate them or construct a new building
in accordance with the provisions of the LIHTC, and take advan-
tage of the credit, with no net addition of housing units to the
affordable housing stock. 47 Low-income renters, especially those
of very low and extremely low-income, would receive greater
benefits if the tax credits were provided directly to them since they
would have more money to spend on housing. A refundable tax
credit system would increase the amount of money available for the
qualifying taxpayers to use toward housing costs, thereby enabling
them to afford better quality housing. This system would also
benefit renters by eliminating the windfall profits that owners can
receive under the present system.
Renters who do not qualify for a tax credit may experience
some harm in the short-term; however, this harm would be
alleviated over time. Under the recommended refundable tax credit
structure, renters not receiving a tax credit, specifically those low-
income renters who do not qualify for the credit, may experience
some loss of well-being in the short-term since the market rents
they face may increase. In response to the qualifying renters' ability
to afford higher rents, market rents would be expected to rise in the
short-term as families bid against each other for the available
housing.1 48 Over the long-term, the supply of decent, affordable
housing would be expected to expand in response to market
demands. This growth in supply would tend to push rents down,
possibly below present rental rates. The increase in the supply of
141 See supra notes 122-29.
"" JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, supra note 73, at 70.
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affordable housing would benefit all low-income renters, regardless
of whether they qualify for a tax credit, by lowering rents.
Another beneficiary of the proposed system of refundable tax
credits would be the owners of low-rent units, since they would
presumably be able to charge slightly higher, although still
affordable, rents for their units. Under the present LIHTC program,
developers and owners of qualifying buildings benefit by receiving
a tax credit. However, owners of buildings that are not subsidized
by tax credits may experience a loss of well-being since they do
not receive the monetary benefit of the credit, and they may lose
tenants to LIHTC projects that charge lower rents. As noted
previously, under a refundable tax credit system, the demand for
housing would be expected to increase. Due to the time necessary
to build or rehabilitate housing units, the housing supply may not
be able to respond quickly enough in certain markets in the short-
term to meet the increase in demand. Therefore, owners of low-rent
units would benefit from an increase in demand for housing since
they would be able to rent their units at slightly higher rates.
Although this may be an unfair result to the low-income families
not receiving a tax credit, this inequity would be alleviated over
time by an increase in the supply of housing. In the long-term, the
increased demand should spur development since developers will
see opportunities for profit and will thus enter the market to
produce more rental housing. Therefore, in the long-term, all
parties should experience some benefit under a refundable tax credit
system.
CONCLUSION
Nearly ten years after the low-income housing tax credit took
effect, it appears that the program has achieved only partial success.
Although tax credits have been used to construct or rehabilitate
over 800,000 rental units, this amount has not met the affordable
housing needs of low-income tenants. Moreover, while the low-
income housing tax credit addresses the need for affordable
housing, it has not led to the development of units that are
affordable for the lowest-income families. However, the LIHTC
cannot, by itself, solve the nation's affordable housing crisis.
Therefore, in light of the persistent shortage of affordable housing,
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Congress must consider making changes to the low-income housing
tax credit in order to ensure that the credit is utilized to best meet
the housing needs of our nation's low-income families.
